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Today’s internet users are still overwhelmed with cookie dialogs while browsing, as web-
site publishers want to obtain approval to use online tracking. Cookie dialogs shown on
websites originate from the ePrivacy Directive passed (ePD) in 2002 and have not left the
internet scene since then. Website publishers need to present such a cookie dialog when
they want to place cookies on the user’s machine for non-essential purposes. Although the
primary use of a cookie is to provide essential purposes such as maintaining a login token
between the client and the server, they are also used for tracking purposes and collecting
user data, e.g., to present specific advertisements. Unfortunately, website publishers do
not always respect the regulation to safeguard users’ privacy and their data. Trevisan et
al. [TTBM19] showed that, from a collection of 35,862 websites, 49 percent set cookies for
tracking purposes before users’ consent. Further, even if a website presents a consent and
reject choice, the visitor is often nudged towards the consent element. Such practice where
design elements are used to persuade a user to click on a particular element is called a dark
pattern. Earlier research performed by Soe et al. [SNGS20] showed that a variety of dark
patterns is implemented in online news outlets. As a result, users’ online privacy rights are
violated, often without their knowledge.
Despite evolved data protection laws, many countries struggle with the actual enforce-
ment of the ePD and GDPR concerning users’ data and protecting their privacy. As there is
no European control system in place that proactively audits website publishers, it is impos-
sible to verify every website for compliance. Currently, the burden lies on the Data Protec-
tion Authority (DPA) of each EU Member State. Citizens of each Member State can lodge
a complaint with their national DPA if their rights concerning personal data are possibly
violated. Only when citizens are aware of certain infringements while visiting a website
can they contact the DPA, which could result in an investigation. Further, big companies
with a large user base are sometimes actively monitored by the DPA, as they have a lot of
influence. As a result, a large pool of websites is not observed by a privacy authority. This is
a major concern, as it means that the majority of websites are free from any control.
For this research, we investigate how we can support the enforcement of the data pro-
tection regulations by providing an automatic process to audit a large set of websites to
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detect violations in cookie dialogs and the cookies set. Investigations conducted by a DPA
are manual labor, and the number of websites is too high to perform audits proactively.
The resources of DPAs are too scarce to conduct such work manually. An automatic pro-
cess that could indicate whether a website is compliant or not enables auditing on a large
scale, which could decline data privacy infringements or at least show to what extent the
current website landscape is compliant.
2.1. SCOPE
There is a limitation on the amount of time and resources we can invest in this research.
Therefore, it is conducted within the following scope.
• Although many legislations exist in the world that regulate personal data process-
ing and protect users’ privacy, we are only interested in the European laws for our
research, i.e., the ePrivacy Directive and the GDPR. Further, we do not examine all
details of these laws as we are concerned about the specifics related to cookie dialogs.
• In the same line, the datasets we use as input for our crawler are websites from Eu-
ropean countries, namely all members from the European Union plus three nearby
countries. However, our research could be extended outside the EU as European data
protection laws also apply to companies worldwide that process data from EU citi-
zens.
• We examine compliance before users’ consent only on the initial website visit and do
not explore possible privacy infringements after a user action, i.e., consent or reject.
• Although there is a wide range of design choices used in cookie dialogs that could be
linked to a dark pattern, we focus on observing the presence of balanced consent and
reject options in a cookie dialog.
• Despite the name suggesting otherwise, website publishers are also obliged to im-
plement a cookie dialog to perform online tracking with other technologies besides
cookies. Although cookies are commonly used, as browsers will prevent third-party
cookies in the future, other technologies such as Web Storage could be used more.
However, for our research, we focus on the use of cookies.
2.2. CONTRIBUTIONS
We list the main contributions of our research.
• To explore automation possibilities, we developed a crawler based on the open-source




detect violations for a preliminary list of rules. Our proof of concept supports future
research on automation capabilities.
• Our research provides insights into the usage of cookie dialogs within Europe. The
same analysis is performed without JavaScript and with the popular uBlock extension
enabled.
• We examined the usage of the IAB Transparency and Consent Framework (TCF), a
community effort that should increase compliance, by Consent Management Providers
(CMPs) in European websites. Website publishers can integrate CMPs to outsource a
cookie dialog implementation and decrease complexity on their part. Earlier studies
that use TCF in their investigation are primarily based on TCF version 1. However, for
our research, we use version 2.
• We collect the cookies that are set when initially visiting a website to detect compli-
ance violations. Our research differs in that we link cookie purposes with the open-
source knowledge base Cookiepedia to perform our analysis.
• We support automation capabilities for dark pattern detection by providing an im-
plementation to automatically detect the presence of balanced consent and reject





Crawlers are a type of bot that can be used to retrieve elements from a website automati-
cally. Search engines also use them to index the content of websites. Although there exist
several terms, such as spiders or scrapers, which can be used to distinct particular details,
we use the general term crawler for this research. There is a distinction between stateful
and stateless crawls. As the name suggests, stateful crawls maintain a certain state between
different browser instances. E.g., this makes it possible to hold login credentials between
browsers, making the crawling process more efficient as the login step needs to be exe-
cuted only once. In the context of privacy measurements, cookies set in the browser will
remain during the crawl execution. This makes it possible to identify trackers for which
techniques are used, such as cookie syncing, cookie respawning [AEE+14], and replication
of user profiles [ERE+15]. On the other hand, stateless crawls do not maintain a state by
which a browser always appears to be a new user. Observation of previously mentioned
techniques is therefore difficult. Currently, OpenWPM does not support the usage of state-
ful crawls. However, this does not thwart the purpose of our research. As we examine each
website separately to observe our defined compliance level, no state has to be maintained
during our crawling process. We can monitor the cookies set for tracking purposes within
each browser instance.
3.2. DATA PROTECTION LAWS
As early as 2000, Peng et al. discussed the concerns around the emerging technology of
cookies [PC00]. They described that if users give away personal information, e.g., through
form inputs, and the data is saved into a cookie, it could be used as tracking technologies.
The researchers concluded that users need to be aware of cookies and know how to refuse
or delete them. A year later, in 2001, Millett et al. provided criteria for assessing online
informed consent [MFF01]. At that time, some browsers provided options for users to han-
dle cookies. E.g., Figure 3.1 depicts the cookie settings offered by Netscape Navigator 4.0,
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a browser project that closed in 2008, by which users could accept only those cookies sent
from the originating server. Further, in the same time area, Friedman et al. proposed a con-
ceptual model of informed consent [FFM00]. Their model was based on five components:
disclosure, comprehension, voluntariness, competence, and agreement. They stated that
some websites manipulated users by bombarding a user with information about cookies.
One effect was that a user would fail to notice a cookie that he or she might want to avoid.
Figure 3.1: Netscape Navigator 4.0 cookies configuration options (adapted from [MFF01]).
In recent decennia, several laws have emerged to protect users’ data. In 2002, the Direc-
tive on Privacy and Electronic Communications (ePD) was enforced on European grounds.
It is mainly concerned about how telecom companies and Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
manages users’ data. Further, Article 5(3) of the directive states the following:
Member States shall ensure that the storing of information, or the gaining of access to
information already stored, in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user is only allowed
on condition that the subscriber or user concerned has his or her consent, having been pro-
vided with clear and comprehensive information, in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC,
inter alia, about the purposes of the processing.1
An important term in the description is ’consent’. By this, publishers are obliged to
ask users’ consent before storing information used for non-essential purposes. However, a
directive does not impose how the rules have to be implemented. Each European member
state implements the details of the directive into national laws. The exact implementation
can therefore differ between different member states.
More recently, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), applicable as of May
25th, 2018, complements the ePD. The GDPR is mainly concerned with the processing of
personal data, while the ePD elaborates on the GDPR regarding electronic communica-
tions. Cookies are mentioned only once in the GDPR, but companies that use them to
track users’ browser activity risk significant fines. Recital 30 of the GDPR states:
Natural persons may be associated with online identifiers provided by their devices, ap-
plications, tools and protocols, such as internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or other
1Article 5(3) ePrivacy Directive
6
identifiers such as radio frequency identification tags.2
This means that when cookies are related to an individual, it is considered as personal
data, and therefore falls under the data protection rules, as mentioned in Recital 26:
The principles of data protection should apply to any information concerning an identi-
fied or identifiable natural person.3
These regulations are the origin of cookie dialogs that users currently encounter daily
when browsing the internet. If website publishers use cookies for non-essential purposes,
i.e., cookies that are not necessary for the main functionality of the website, they have to
inform the user unambiguously about which cookies will be set on the user machine. Fur-
ther, users must have the option to reject or accept the use of such non-essential cookies.
The distinction between cookies used for essential and non-essential purposes can be de-
scribed as follows4:
Essential cookies:
• used solely to carry out or facilitate the transmission of communications over a net-
work, or
• strictly necessary to provide an online service that users have requested.
Non-essential cookies:
• these are any cookies that do not fall within the definition of essential cookies, such
as cookies used to analyze your behavior on a website (‘analytical’ cookies) or cookies
used to display advertisements (‘advertising’ cookies).
Besides the previous distinction on the purpose of a cookie, other classifications exist.
First, we can distinguish a cookie based on its duration. Cookies that only exist temporarily
during a browser session, i.e., deleted after closing the browser, are called session cookies.
On the other hand, persistent cookies are saved on the user machine even after the browser
is closed. To erase these cookies, users have to delete them from their machine manually.
Although these types of cookies also have a duration, they often exist for a long period
without manual intervention. Secondly, we can categorize cookies based on their origin.
First-party cookies are set by the website a user visits. Contrary, third-party cookies are set
by another website and therefore have another origin than the website a user visits. This
last category is often linked with cookies used for marketing and tracking purposes since
the same third party can be connected to many different websites.
Still in progress is the ePrivacy Regulation (ePR), which will replace the ePD to sim-
plify and strengthen the privacy rules. E.g., it proposes that no consent will be needed for





online tracking. Until then, explicit consent from the user is required. A foreword by the
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS)5, states that although the current ePD already
provides individuals with a degree of protection in the context of electronic communica-
tions, its scope and provisions no longer ensure a sufficient degree of protection. The rapid
advancements in technological developments outdated the provisions of the ePD, which
did aspire to be technologically neutral.
Further, a European body called the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) exists as
a central EU entity to safeguard the data protection laws. Their mission is to ensure consis-
tent application in the EU of the GDPR and the Law Enforcement Directive (LED)6. LED is
another legislation that handles the protection of personal data that falls outside the scope
of the GDPR, namely the processing of personal data in law enforcement, which is explic-
itly excluded from the GDPR7. However, Leiser et al. [Lei19] conclude that LED has limited
transparency requirements and lower standards for protecting data subject rights than the
GDPR. The EDPB mainly provides general guidance to support comprehension of these
data protection laws and ensures correct application of it in individual cases. However, the
EDPB does not enforce EU data protection laws. Their members8 include the Data Protec-
tion Authorities (DPAs) of the EU countries and the European Data Protection Supervisor
(EDPS). The EDPS is an independent EU data protection authority. They have the powers of
investigation, corrective powers and sanctions, and authorization and advisory powers. In
particular, in case of complaints from individuals, they have the authority to bring infringe-
ments to the attention of the Court of Justice and powers to engage in legal proceedings in
accordance with the primary law9.
3.3. TRANSPARENCY AND CONSENT FRAMEWORK
The Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB) of Europe supports advertising businesses and
website publishers by developing certain standards that should help the community to be
compliant with the regulations. The Transparency and Consent Framework (TCF) is such
a framework the IAB introduced. This framework establishes a set of global technical stan-
dards to establish trust and transparency between all involved actors. According to their
own declaration, TCF is the only GDPR consent solution built by and for the industry, cre-
ating a true industry-standard approach10. Figure 3.2 depicts the actors and how they relate
to each other. One of the actors is a Consent Management Provider (CMP), a central unit
that website publishers can use to collect users’ consent (1). The user’s consent, together
with its selected purposes, is stored in a consent string, which the CMP further processes
(2). Then, consent is further transferred to vendors that are registered with the IAB TCF (3).
Lastly, an advertiser can collect the user data to display specific ads on the website (4).
CMPs that register with TCF are required to take and pass the CMP validator, developed
5https://edpl.lexxion.eu/data/article/11389/pdf/edpl_2017_02-006.pdf
6https://edpb.europa.eu/about-edpb/about-edpb/who-we-are_en





Figure 3.2: The actors and activities involved when using a Consent Management Provider (CMP) under IAB
Europe’s TCF (adapted from [MBS20]).
by IAB Europe, to verify that the implementation of the CMP is compliant with the techni-
cal specifications11. When validated and approved, a unique ID is assigned to the registered
CMP and added to the IAB CMP list12. This validation process is repeated each year for ev-
ery registered CMP. Vendors can participate in TCF by filling in a specific registration form
where they need to declare the purposes for which personal data will be processed. In ad-
dition, they need to indicate on which legal basis they rely to process the collected data.
Besides relying on consent, vendors can choose to rely on legitimate interest, which means
they can freely use the collected personal data in a way the user would expect. It is the most
flexible condition under the GDPR for processing personal data. However, the EDPB stated
that the legitimate interest condition is not an appropriate lawful basis for processing per-
sonal data related to tracking, profiling, and advertising13 14. Research performed by Santos
et al. [MSB20] showed that hundreds of advertisers rely on legitimate interest for purposes
that instead should rely on consent. Such statements and research findings do not sup-
port the IAB declaration of enhancing transparency in the community. In recent years, TCF
has undergone several updates. Figure 3.3 depicts the two major versions and their related
purposes15. As of version 2, vendors need to indicate a legal basis for 12 purposes. Most
of these added purposes originate from a purpose of version 1. Two special purposes are
11https://iabeurope.eu/tcf-for-cmps
12https://iabeurope.eu/cmp-list
13"Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation (WP 203), adopted on 2/04/2013"
https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp203_en.pdf
14"Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data controller under Article
7 of directive 95/46/ec (WP 217)" https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2014/wp217
15https://iabeurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/TCF-v2-Webinar-Publishers-webinar.pdf - slide 20
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added to the new version, which vendors can use to provide technical functionalities.





In recent years, numerous studies have been conducted to examine the possible infringe-
ments of cookie banners. Matte et al. investigated the use of banners from IAB Europe’s
Transparency and Consent Framework (TCF) [MBS20]. The authors observed the avail-
ability of an opt-out option, and if a users’ choice is respected. Therefore, three computer
scientists performed manual checks to confirm violations. Their findings conclude that
6.8% of their dataset does not provide a refusal option. They identified violations by also
examining available options in a possible second layer of a banner. Our research does not
perform such manual checks as our goal is to provide an automated process. In RQ4, we
observe if consent and reject options are available in the first layer, as these should be of-
fered in the same way [SBM19]. Further, the authors notice that some vendors associated
with the IAB framework use trackers, even when a user refused consent. The authors ac-
knowledge that their study examined IAB Europe TCF version 1. Our research is based on
TCF version 2. However, we do not examine consent strings of IAB to identify for which
purposes consent is given.
The same researchers, Matte et al., analyzed the purposes for data collection in more
depth which advertisers involved in the TCF can employ [MSB20]. The two main legal bases
for processing data are consent or legitimate interest. By analyzing the purposes declared
by the registered advertisers, they reveal that hundreds of advertisers rely on legitimate
interest for purposes that should rely on consent. A positive evolution is that the choice
of legitimate interest is slowly decreasing. These findings mainly cover version 1 of TCF.
The authors note that version 2 could become more popular as Google’s CMP will adopt
this version. Automating their analysis to identify when advertisers use a purpose without
legal grounds is a difficult task as legitimate interest is a legal basis, and the actual purpose
for data processing can be hard to uncover. Therefore, our research does not cover such
purpose analysis.
In other research, Santos et al. propose 22 requirements that cookie banners must meet
to be fully compliant with the GDPR and ePrivacy Directive guidelines [SBM19]. They used
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a bottom-up approach to start from the legal sources to formulate the requirements. They
tested each proposed requirement manually on several websites and defined possible vi-
olations. E.g., their first requirement states that consent must be obtained before a user
identifier is stored. Manual tests show that even well-established companies fail to address
such a basic requirement to protect users’ data. Other requirements mostly face the same
conclusion. Many websites seem not to apply the authors’ proposals. However, some re-
quirements are subject to interpretation, e.g., a user should have a balanced choice to either
accept or reject a consent. Because there is no defined standard in cookie banner design, it
is complicated to draw clear conclusions. Their study’s main contribution is the link to ac-
tual legal sources, which could wake some legal auditors. Our research extends their work,
as we cover some elements defined by their legal requirements and examine the integra-
tion into an automated process. Rule 13 of their defined requirements states a banner must
present a fair or balanced design choice. This requirement forms the basis for our analy-
sis of RQ4, where we identify consent and reject elements to identify a dark pattern. The
authors state that it is not possible to verify this requirement automatically because of the
lack of standards in cookie banner design. However, we consider that some design choices
nudge users to consent and can relatively easily be identified by an automated crawler.
Another study by Trevisan et al. analyzed a large dataset of websites with an automation
tool to check the compliance of cookie banners to the ePrivacy Directive (ePD) [TTBM19].
Their analysis looked for a difference in the domain of the installing cookie and the visited
website. If at least one profiling cookie is found, the website is marked as violating the ePD.
Results show that 49% of the tested websites do not respect the ePD and install profiling
cookies before any users’ consent is given. In this complex ecosystem dominated by ad-
vertisers and where web services need to monetize the content they offer, it is still difficult
for legislators to regulate online privacy. Therefore, the authors conclude that the enforce-
ment of the ePD is a failure. However, this study is conducted just after the introduction
of the GDPR. So actual improvements due to these added legislations are not evaluated.
As our research is performed three years after the GDPR enforcement, website publishers
have had the time to adapt according to the legislation. Also, our method to detect viola-
tions differs as our implementation is based on OpenWPM. We observe the cookies set and
discover their purpose by using an open knowledge base.
4.2. DARK PATTERNS
Soe et al. and Nouwens et al. examined the use of so-called dark patterns that mislead and
nudge users into giving consent [SNGS20, NLV+20]. The first study manually tested 300
websites to identify the use of dark patterns in cookie banners. Besides data collection be-
fore a users’ consent, which they also identify as a dark pattern, the authors describe other
new dark patterns based on existing ones examined in other studies. E.g., the use of “mul-
tiple choice panels” is identified on several websites where the reject option is given in only
one smaller panel. To verify their observations, they conducted two studies. One in 2019
and the second in April 2020, in which they revisited the 300 websites. One of the results
shows that a user needs an average of 10 clicks to opt-out of all cookies. Further, the use of
more privacy-friendly words, such as “deny” or “reject”, are not commonly used. Also, the
purpose of the cookies is only given for 125 out of the 300 websites. However, as their data
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set only consisted of news outlets and magazines, a more varied set of websites could yield
different results. Our research uses more varied datasets, i.e., the top 500 websites of all
European countries filtered from the global Tranco list. The authors urge the need for stan-
dard terminology so that users clearly understand the consent information. Also, to make
an audit more feasible and reliable, regulators should rely on some automatic process to
flag violations to increase compliance, which we investigate in our research by focusing on
automation.
The second study by Nouwens et al. investigated interface designs of Consent Manage-
ment Providers (CMPs) regarding their compliance with the EU’s General Data Protection
Regulation and how these affect users’ consent actions [NLV+20]. Several variables from
the design interface were collected, such as the CMP vendor and the presence of accept
and reject buttons. They looked for an identifying HTML element to determine the pres-
ence of a particular CMP. In comparison, in RQ1, we detect a CMP by performing the ping
operation. In extension, we do not only examine the presence of a CMP. In RQ2, we also
identify if a cookie dialog is displayed when visiting a website. Nouwens et al. used three
measurable requirements to evaluate if a certain provider is compliant or not. These re-
quirements alone are not sufficient to be legally compliant but can be measured in a quan-
titive manner. Their results show that of the 680 websites, 16,8% records consent when the
user visits the website, and more than 50% did not have a button to reject all purposes. We
also take into account the native language of each country of our dataset to observe the
presence of accept and consent buttons to expand our search field. Secondly, they exam-
ined how 40 participants interacted with consent pop-ups by using a browser extension.
Interesting to notice is that by removing the “reject all” button, the probability of consent
increases with more than 22 percentage points. As the participants were all computer sci-
ence department members, a more general public could produce other outcomes. Further,
the study by Mathur et al. investigated the use of dark patterns in shopping websites and
taxonomized these patterns based on several characteristics [MAF+19].1
The importance of a transdisciplinary approach to improve current legal guidelines on
the use of dark patterns is discussed by Gray et al. [GSB+20]. They reviewed recordings
from over 50 sites and analyzed the design and users’ means of interaction with the con-
sent banners on these websites. For every phase they identified in the consent task flow,
outcomes were analyzed from a designer, user, interface, and social impact perspective.
E.g., the authors identify the use of a tracking-wall, which is an instance of a consent wall
but with a more aggravating element. Besides blocking access to the website, the user has
only one option, namely, to accept. Such walls make it difficult for a user to make a specific
and informed consent. The authors mention that although these outcomes are clear from
a legal perspective, it is difficult to indicate which design elements are lawfully suitable.
There is a need for standardization as there are no uniform design requirements to check
compliance with the GDPR. Therefore, they advocate for combined research between le-
gal, ethics, and Human-Computer Interaction. However, detecting all design requirements
automatically for compliance will be difficult as several are interpretive and need different
combined methods, such as manual analysis.
1Overview of the findings of “Dark Patterns at Scale: Findings from a Crawl of 11K Shopping Websites”, Web-
Tap Princeton University, July 17, 2019, https://webtransparency.cs.princeton.edu/dark-patterns
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4.3. CRAWLING
The process of crawling to collect artifacts and specific data automatically from websites
is a popular method to broaden the range of analysis and is often used in research. Matte
et al. built a crawler, namely Cookinspect, based on a Selenium instrumented Chromium
[MBS20]. Thereby, they could perform a fully automated scan to detect whether a web-
site uses a TCF banner. During the scan, they also checked the storage of positive consent
and the existence of third-party tracking requests before any user action. Further anal-
ysis showed that 46.5% of the websites pre-tick purpose options, and 5.3% set a consent
string without respecting a users’ refusal. Trevisan et al. also implemented a tool called
CookieCheck to perform an automated scan [TTBM19]. Nouwens et al. developed a web
scraper to collect data about the top 5 CMPs using Alexa’s 10,000 most popular websites in
the UK to conduct their study [NLV+20]. The authors conclude that automated tools could
support data protection authorities in enforcing legislation. By employing the string meth-
ods and additional information gathered from web pages, Uzun et al. uses an approach
called UzunExt [Uzu20]. This approach uses additional information to improve a crawler’s
execution time, which is an often ignored property in research. In our research, we use
a similar method as the aforementioned studies to provide automation. Although we do
not build our crawler from scratch, we use OpenWPM, an open-source automation project
specifically focused on privacy studies, to perform our analysis. Using this tool gives us the
advantage of focusing our implementation on our specific research needs as OpenWPM
provides several built-in data collection hooks.
Another study by Jonker et al. investigated the extent to which bot detection occurs,
which can severely impact the outcomes of research findings [JKV19]. The authors used
fingerprinting techniques that rely on browsers’ properties and the DOM model to estab-
lish a so-called fingerprint surface of a web bot. A scan of the Alexa top 1 million revealed
that many of the top sites use PhantomJs-detection. These websites can distinguish a reg-
ular website visit by a user from a visit performed by a crawler that uses the PhantomJs
browser. Less common is the use of client-side detection for bot detection. They also ex-
amined if sites that employ bot detection act differently to users. Four types of different
behaviors were discovered, e.g., for a selection of 20 websites, 12 websites present different
content to a web bot. Their main finding is that PhantomJs is highly detectable as a web
bot. 12% of the top 1 million Alexa sites detect the use of PhantomJs. Our implementation
of OpenWPM does not use PhantomJs for browser automation. In order to decrease bot




In this section, we discuss general methodology topics related to all research questions that
we will cover. As each of our research questions uses a specific methodology, we discuss
further specifics in the relevant sections.
5.1. RULING SYSTEM
A crucial element in our research is how we determine if a website is compliant or not. Our
ruling system needs to be based upon existing laws. The extent and detailed descriptions of
current laws require specific knowledge and expertise in the field of jurisdiction. In our field
of software engineering, we do not possess this expertise. That is why a transdisciplinary
approach is necessary to tackle our research topic, an observation that is previously noted
by Gray et al. [GSB+20]. However, this does not mean we cannot make valid observations
about the outcomes of our scanning output or by performing an audit on a limited set of
websites. We consider one rule of the ePD as fundamental. I.e., the obligation that websites
must obtain users’ informed consent before using any kind of tracking technology. The
definition of "informed" and its exact meaning requires expertise in the field of jurisdiction,
which we consider a grey area. To analyze the existence of such an informed consent, our
scanner would have to support linguistic analysis to identify certain semantic properties.
This is not in the scope of our current research. Therefore, we exclude the terminology
"informed" from our rules. Further, there exist many tracking technologies that put users’
privacy at risk. Table 5.1 shows a list of privacy threats examined by an analysis conducted
by Estrada-Jiménez et al. [EPRF17]
However, our research focuses on the usage of cookie dialogs. Therefore, our main con-
cern is when cookies are set and for what purpose. Further, Santos et al. analyzed the legal
and technical requirements of consent dialogs under the GDPR and ePD. They identified
22 requirements from legal sources and both technical and legal experts to verify compli-
ance of cookie dialogs [SBM19]. We distill one specific requirement, R13, from their re-
search: website publishers need to offer a balanced consent choice. This means that users










Table 5.1: List of privacy threats examined by Estrada-Jiménez et al. [EPRF17].
the validation assessment needs to be performed fully manually as currently there are no
standards in cookie banner design. We think this requirement is a good starting point for
our examination. I.e., to detect a limited set of design elements that violate the regula-
tions automatically. Although Santos et al. discuss other requirements, we select R13 from
their research as others can already be partially automatically assessed. We define the rules
outlined in Table 5.2. Detecting a violation of one or more of these rules results in a non-
compliant website.
Rule Description Origin
R1 Cookies for targeting/advertising purposes
must not be set before user consent
ePD/GDPR
R2 Balanced consent and refuse choices Requirements from Santos et
al. [SBM19]
Table 5.2: Defined ruling system used for our research.
5.2. EXTENDING OPENWPM
To perform our defined compliance checks in an automatic process, we use a web crawler.
I.e., a bot that can navigate to specified URLs to collect data of the visited website. In 2016,
Englehardt et al. implemented a tool named OpenWPM, specifically aimed at web privacy
measurement research [EN16]. OpenWPM is built on top of Firefox and uses Selenium1 to
enable browser automation. To perform data collection, several hooks to instrument the
automation are made available. OpenWPM is an open-source project and can therefore be
easily extended2. We use this tool as the basis of our crawler implementation. Figure 5.1
shows the high-level components that are part of OpenWPM.
The task manager distributes commands to the browser managers, which on their terms,
provide an abstraction layer for automation of each browser instance. The code snippet in
Listing 5.1 appends the GET command to a sequence of commands, which are then passed




Figure 5.1: High-level components of openWPM [EN16].
Listing 5.1: GetCommand appended to the command sequence.
command_sequence . append_command(GetCommand( url = s i t e , sleep =3) , timeout =60)
After Selenium visits the provided URL, the depicted GET command will wait for 3 sec-
onds. The timeout indicates that if Selenium can not reach the website, an error will occur.
The number of browser instances that run simultaneously can be set through a config pa-
rameter. The data aggregator module forms another abstraction layer for the browser in-
strumentation. Our implementation extends the default OpenWPM task manager to pro-
vide extra commands to the browser managers. OpenWPM is built with Python and Python
libraries. Our extended version uses OpenWPM v0.13.03. At the time of writing, a new ma-
jor release, v0.14.04, is released. This new version contains several major refactorings that
could break our extended implementation. Further, currently unknown or untested side
effects could output different results. Therefore, our implementation will continue to use
v0.13.0.
Some websites employ bot detection mechanisms, which may result in different con-
tent being shown to the visitor, restriction of resources, or exclusion from a website[JKV19].
Such techniques can put a restraint on the results of our study if the bot does not simulate
an actual website visit. OpenWPM provides an optional browser parameter that can be set
to mitigate employed bot detection techniques. Table 5.3 lists the three mitigation mecha-
nisms used by OpenWPM during the execution of the GET command. We ran our crawler
against the top 100 websites of France with bot mitigation disabled and enabled. Compar-





bot mitigation 1 move the cursor randomly around a number
of times
bot mitigation 2 scroll in random intervals down page
bot mitigation 3 randomly wait so page visits happen with ir-
regularity
Table 5.3: Optional built-in bot mitigation techniques performed by OpenWPM.
5.3. DATASET
For this research, we use a list of top websites that serves as the input for our crawler to
perform the analysis. There are several top website lists available. E.g., Amazon provides
a Software-as-a-Service named Alexa, which is based on its Alexa Traffic Rank data5. Alexa
gathers its data by providing a browser extension6 which extracts web visits from the users.
Their website list is based upon the number of users that install and enable the browser
extension. However, Le Pochat et al. [PvGT+19] showed in their research how easily the
Alexa website ranking can be manipulated through the use of the browser extension. Even
a small number of page visits leads to a substantially higher ranking. This way, adversaries
can manipulate the ranking with minimal effort. Their research showed that other often
used top website lists such as Cisco Umbrella, Majestic, and Quantcast are also susceptible
to manipulation. When such lists are used in research studies, it affects the results, and any
biases may hinder correct conclusions. Also, a portion of the top website lists are unreach-
able or do not respond with a successful status code. Le Pochat et al. identified that only
49% of the Umbrella list websites responded with a status code 200, and 30% returned a
server error. Therefore, the researchers produced a top website list named Tranco, based
upon the rankings of Alexa, Umbrella, and Majestic. Tranco has several built-in manipu-
lation countermeasures. First, domains that appear only in one or a few lists are filtered
out, as this is recognized as an isolated manipulation attempt. Secondly, potential mali-
cious domains can be removed using the Google Safe Browsing list7. Further, it obtains
one million domains by averaging all three rankings over the past 30 days, thereby reduc-
ing the effect of a possible manipulated list. All three rankings need to be manipulated to
the same extent to influence the combined Tranco list. Also, it is possible to retrieve a past
version of the standard Tranco list, which enables reproducibility. Other rankings change
daily, making it difficult to retrieve a list from the past to reproduce a certain result. Tranco
is an open-source contribution and therefore freely available for anyone8. The researchers
provided a webpage with many configuration options to generate a Tranco list9.
Our research uses generated Tranco lists with a specific configuration. First, from all the
available combined domains, we only retain the Pay-Level Domains (PLDs). A PLD is a sub-
domain of a top-level domain (TLD) by which we can identify a single user or organization







Notice that a TLD can contain another subdomain. E.g., the United Kingdom uses "co.uk"
where "co" is a subdomain of the TLD uk. Therefore is not a PLD.
Figure 5.2: The different parts of an URL and their naming.
Next, for each country that is part of our test list, we use the country code top-level
domain (ccTLD), a TLD reserved for countries. The ccTLD is used as a filter to only obtain
websites of a certain country. Table 5.4 shows three ccTLDs used for our research as a filter





Table 5.4: Partial list of countries with their associated ccTLD used as a filter to generate datasets with Tranco.
Further, domains flagged as dangerous by Google Safe Browsing are removed from the
generated data set. This decreases the chance that a website with malicious content is
visited during an automatic crawl, possibly infecting the system with malware or compro-
mising data. Although we run our crawler in an isolated environment, we want to reduce
possible overhead due to an infected system. Also, our generated data sets have a unique
ID. Other researchers can use our data sets for their study or to reproduce certain results we
present here10. Therefore, we should mitigate possible threats as we have no control over
the environments where these data sets might be used.
Tranco generates the combined list using the Dowdall rule. The first domain gets 1
point, the second 1/2 points, and the last 1/N points, which results in a statistical distri-
bution of website popularity called the long-tail effect. A low number of websites have a
high visitor rate. On the other hand, there are a large number of rarely-visited websites.
10https://github.com/koenae/openwpm-crawler/tree/master/datasets
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The former is shown by the curve’s steep shape, while the latter forms the long tail. Fig-
ure 5.3 shows an example of such a distribution. Kumar et al. examined website popularity
by measuring a number of website requests, taking into account the location and time of
the requests, which resulted in a similar long-tail distribution [KNS09].
Figure 5.3: Popularity of websites depicted as a long-tail distribution (modified from [KNS09]).
Applying our filters to the aggregated Tranco list for each country, we take the top 500
domains. Alternatively, we could spread our set of 500 websites per country evenly over
several segments. E.g., for each successive 1000 websites of the Tranco list, we could take
100 websites until we have a similar subset of 500 websites. This way, our subset would
contain more websites that are infrequently used. However, the websites of the top 500
have the most impact on the internet landscape. In correlation, this means that our results
have a higher impact, as even minor compliance violations affect a large user base.
5.4. SYSTEM SETUP
First, we ran our extended implementation of OpenWPM on a Virtual Machine (VM) with
Ubuntu version 18.04.5 LTS. Table 5.5 lists the configuration of the VM.
Setting Value
Memory 3.8 GB
Processor Intel® Core™ i7-4870HQ CPU @ 2.50GHz × 2
OS type 64-bit
Virtualization KVM
Table 5.5: Our VM configuration running on Ubuntu.
Running multiple crawlers on one VM is possible. However, the browser processes of
each crawler instance sometimes conflict with each other, which increases the number of
incomplete visits. Therefore, using this system setup is not scalable. We migrated our VM
to Proxmox11, an open-source virtualization platform where you can quickly scale up re-
11https://www.proxmox.com
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sources and VMs. Our Proxmox server has 32 GB memory and 8 CPUs available. We con-
figured and converted one VM as a template so that we can easily build a new VM by using
the template without having to reconfigure all settings. Figure 5.4 shows the server view
of our Proxmox installation with six crawler VMs that we can run simultaneously. The last
instance depicts our created template.
Figure 5.4: Our Proxmox crawler setup.
5.5. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The use of a crawler to collect data from websites is subject to some ethical aspects. Thel-
wall et al. [TS06] reviewed several moral issues to provide a new set of guidelines for web
crawlers. They identified types of problems that can arise for society or individuals, which
we will use here for our discussion relating to our research.
Denial of service. Thelwall et al. [TS06] mention that when a server is busy responding
to robot requests, it may slow down response times to other users. Such behavior would
interfere with the primary purpose of a website to deliver its online content and service to
users. On today’s expansive internet, websites may need to process a high number of re-
quests. We ran our crawler on a maximum of five hundred websites per European country,
which is only a small portion of the available websites. Further, we only visit the homepage
of a website to collect data and DOM elements of the content. Our crawler does not per-
form navigation steps to other URL paths within the same website. Therefore, the impact of
the website visit we perform automatically is limited. Although our implementation could
contain errors we are not aware of, we did not encounter errors during the execution of
the crawler that indicated a denial of service. Also, we ran our crawler only a few times per
research question with a significant time interval in between.
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Cost. As the bandwidth of web hosts has its limitations, exceeding it can incur costs for
website owners. Thelwall et al. [TS06] noticed that consequences range from automatically
paying the excess cost to disabling the website. However, our crawler does not download
full pages of content. As we are only interested in selected elements from a cookie dialog,
our bandwidth usage is limited. However, future extensions of our implementation would
have to take into account such limitations.
Privacy. The internet is a public domain. Therefore, viewing and downloading the con-
tent of a website automatically by a crawler does not invade privacy. The same actions can
be manually performed, which means regular users are subject to similar privacy princi-
ples. Although a crawler could be implemented to visit specific URL paths which are not
visible on the website, our implementation only detects cookie dialogs and related artifacts
on the homepage. Also, we do not store most of the data we find on websites, only specific
elements from a cookie dialog needed to detect violations.
Copyright. Making permanent copies of copyright material, i.e., web pages, without per-
mission of the publisher is an illegal practice [TS06]. E.g., the Internet Archive12 stores web
pages to make them publicly freely available. They use an opt-out policy by which owners
can keep their content out of the archive. We acknowledge that we do not make it possible
for websites to opt out from the privacy research we perform. However, we do not make
our saved data publicly available. Only our analysis results for which we filter the gathered
content can be openly viewed. Further, we do not take screenshots of the cookie dialogs we
detect or download full website pages.
Robots Exclusion Protocol. Publishers can use the Robots Exclusion Protocol13 to pre-
vent a crawler from navigating to certain paths of a website. Therefore, they need to place
a file named robots.txt with instructions to prevent crawlers from scanning certain areas.
Listing 5.2 shows the robots.txt file from the OU website14, which displays instructions to
disallow a crawler from scanning specific paths.
Listing 5.2: Robots.txt file from https://www.ou.nl/robots.txt.
User−Agent : *
Disallow : /web/studieaanbod/




Disallow : /web/ psychologie /
Disallow : /web/rechtswetenschappen/
Disallow : /web/nieuws−en−agenda/






Disallow : /web/ senior −digi −vaardig /
Disallow : /* p_p_id
Disallow : /* p_auth
Disallow : /* r e d i r e c t e r
Allow : /* p_p_id=UserProfileViewer_WAR_userprofileportlets_cws
Allow : /* p_p_id=UserProfileViewer_WAR_profieldienst
Sitemap : https : / /www. ou . nl /sitemap . xml
Thelwall et al. [TS06] mention that ethical crawlers will read the instructions and obey
them. However, our crawler does not scan available robots.txt files. Presumably, website
publishers want to ban crawlers from specific paths, as shown in the previous Listing 5.2.
On the other hand, we only visit the homepage of a website. Also, our crawler is currently
used to only perform specific needs for our research. However, if our crawler would be
used on a wider scale, extracting the robots.txt instructions should be considered. Further,
as this is an extra step in the crawler process, it would increase the running time.
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RQ1: TO WHAT EXTENT DO WEBSITES
OFFER A COOKIE DIALOG?
The wide range of different implementations makes it a difficult task to detect whether an
element on the website is a cookie dialog or not. Figure 6.1a depicts the HTML div element
used for the cookie dialog of the website www.ad.nl. The element has a CSS class attribute
with the name ’type-modal’. This may indicate that a modal is used to ask for consent.
However, the modal could be shown for another purpose, e.g., to select the desired user
language. Figure 6.1b shows another example, now from www.ah.nl. Here, the modal is
related to an HTML div element with a CSS id attribute ’cookie-popup’. The name suggests
that the modal is used to ask for consent, which in this case is. However, it could be that
attribute names related to a cookie dialog are used for other purposes, are not visible to the
user, or are deliberately used to trick privacy investigations. Although we acknowledge the
shortcomings of examining HTML attribute names to detect a cookie dialog, we use this
method in our research as there is no waterproof alternative. Secondly, we can integrate
this method in our crawler implementation to cover a high number of websites. Taking a
screenshot of the website and detecting a cookie dialog with image recognition could be
an alternative as OpenWPM provides an option to save screenshots. However, the image
detection analysis afterward is likely more complex.
6.1. EXPERIMENT
We extended our OpenWPM implementation with a command named "detect_cookie_dialog"
to automatically detect a cookie dialog when initially visiting a website during a crawl.
To determine whether an HTML element is a cookie dialog, we base our decision on ex-
isting lists of HTML/CSS attributes commonly used by ad-block browser extensions. Ad-
block1, a well-known browser extension to block advertisers, provides filter lists that they
use for their extension. They have divided their lists into different categories for specific
1https://adblockplus.org
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(a) Selected HTML cookie dialog element from www.ad.nl. (b) Selected HTML cookie dialog element from www.ah.nl.
Figure 6.1: Selected cookie dialog HTML elements.
purposes2. We use the filter list specifically aimed at blocking cookie banners3. This list
is an extension of EasyList, a filter list created in 2005 by Rick Petnel4, which is widely
used. When a user enables the AdBlock extension, it will look if certain HTML/CSS at-
tribute names of the visited website match the list items. If there is a match, AdBlock
will hide the element so that the user is not bothered with notification popups. We use
the same technique to detect the presence of a cookie dialog. Fanboy’s list not only con-
sists of attributes to hide notifications, but it also contains advanced rules to block third-
party scripts. These script blocking rules are not necessary for our cookie dialog detection.
Therefore, we took over the CSS ID and Class attributes in two separate files, used as input
for our XPath queries.
Besides using specific names in HTML attributes, websites can also use an inline iframe
to implement a cookie dialog. An iframe embeds another webpage into the existing page.
The benefit of using this method is that websites can load content from external sources
without the interference of the current page. E.g., Figure 6.2 depicts the selection of an
iframe of the website www.nu.nl. Its source attribute links to external content from dpg-
media.nl. The iframe has its own HTML head and body tags as it is a separate inline page.
Our detection command searches for iframes within the visited webpage. A webpage can
contain multiple iframes, e.g., to show several advertisements. Therefore, we loop over
all the available iframes to filter out the possible cookie dialog. First, we base our detec-
tion decision on the source attribute of the iframe element and analyze if the source string
contains the words "cmp" or "consent". If no element was found, based on this selection
criteria, we search further in the embedded webpage of the iframe. To make it possible to
switch into the context of the iframe, we first navigate to it via the Selenium command
switch_to.frame(frame), with the frame parameter being the iframe element. Then, we
search for the existence of HTML elements with a class attribute that contains the string
"banner", "consent", or "cmp". If no match is found, we conclude that there is no iframe
used for a cookie dialog. Our selection criteria for the iframe source and class attribute





alogs of the top 50 Belgium and Netherlands websites to know what names are commonly
used in cookie dialog attributes. We acknowledge that we did not investigate other ban-
ners from a website, e.g., those related to advertisements. However, our further mentioned
validation outcomes show that our crawler does identify cookie dialogs instead of adver-
tisements.
Figure 6.2: Selected iframe from www.nu.nl.
6.2. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
We ran our crawler against the top 500 website lists of ccTLDs of all European Union mem-
bers plus three non-EU members (UK, Norway and, Switzerland) filtered from Tranco’s
worldwide list, which we also use for the following research questions. Figures 6.3a and 6.3b
show the cookie dialog detection rates of The Netherlands and Belgium respectively by per-
forming a crawl with our command "detect_cookie_dialog" enabled. These first results
show that The Netherlands has a higher percentage of cookie dialogs compared to Bel-
gium, namely, 43.6% and 53.7%. Further, the United Kingdom has a high detection rate,
depicted in Figure 6.3c. We detected that 31.9% of the crawled UK websites do not visu-
alize any cookie dialog to the user. On the contrary, our crawl detected the highest rate of
websites that do not use a cookie dialog for Estonia, with an outcome of 70.7%, as outlined
in Figure 6.3d. Figures 6.3e and 6.3f show the results for Ireland and Switzerland respec-
tively. The detection rates for Ireland are similar to the UK. Switzerland, a country known
for preserving users’ privacy, seems to have low detection rates. Low detection rates do not
necessarily have to result in higher regulation violations. It could be that more websites
do not want to set cookies for non-essential purposes and therefore do not ask for users’
consent. A trend that is noticed in the detection results of all countries is that iframes are
often used to visualize a cookie dialog. CSS class attributes have overall low detection rates.
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It seems that such attributes are rarely used.
(a) The Netherlands. (b) Belgium.
(c) UK. (d) Estonia.
(e) Ireland. (f) Switzerland.
Figure 6.3: Cookie dialog detection.
6.3. VALIDITY
To validate the correctness of our cookie dialog detection rates, we manually reviewed a
list of websites to observe if the website visualizes a cookie dialog or not. Next, we com-
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pared the outcomes of our manual examination with the results of the crawl output. We
based the validation on two countries, The Netherlands and Belgium. For each country,
we took a sample of 100 websites, i.e., the first and last 50 websites. This way, we have
a mixed sample of both often, and less-visited websites as this could influence the pres-
ence of cookie dialogs. The manual validation results for the Belgium sample show that
our crawler does not detect 14 websites that show a cookie dialog. One website is falsely
reported to present a dialog. Validating the sample for The Netherlands results in similar
numbers. Twelve websites that show a dialog are not detected by our crawler. Similarly,
one website is falsely reported to contain a dialog. These first validation results reveal an
error margin of 13 to 15 percent. This means that our measurement of "no dialog found" is
an overcount. With a precision and recall of respectively 0.98 and 0.8, the F1 score, which
takes both false positives and false negatives into account, results in 0.88. One reason for
this is that our XPath query searches for a hard match, i.e., it looks if an item of the id and
class lists equals the value of an HTML element attribute. E.g., our crawler indicates that
the website www.vlaamsparlement.be does not show a cookie dialog. However, when we
visit the website, a dialog is shown at the top of the page. Figure 6.4 the HTML element that
is part of the dialog. The button element has a class with the value "eu-cookie-compliance-
default-button".
Our detection command does not find this element because it searches for an exact
match. Therefore, we should add this value manually to our lists to find this dialog in
subsequent crawls. We could have chosen to use a fuzzy search and not an exact match.
However, such a method would increase the chance of false positives as certain elements
will be wrongly detected as a dialog. E.g., if our XPath query would perform a search for
strings containing the value "cookie", it could be associated with elements like a link to
the cookie policy or elements of a cookie factory website. Our validation confirms that our
matching techniques limit the number of false positives. A total of 2 websites indicate the
presence of a cookie dialog wrongly. The downside is that some cookie dialogs are not dis-
covered, as mentioned earlier. An option to further enhance our dialog detection technique
would be to introduce more advanced selectors. Adblock Plus also uses such a technique
to spot and block advertisements. E.g., they use extended CSS selectors to detect specific
advertisement content. One example of this is :-abp-has(> div > a.advertiser), which selects
elements that contain, as a direct descendant, a <div> that contains an <a> with the class
advertiser5. However, they note that such selectors must be sparingly used as it impacts
performance.
Secondly, the values of our lists used for detecting HTML elements mainly consist of
English words. We chose the English language as currently available lists from Adblock
and others also use the English vocabulary. Further, manually inspecting HTML elements
in the browsers confirms that, although the website uses another language, the code and
related HTML tags are often written in English. Front-end frameworks such as Angular or
React, often used in today’s websites, also use the English vocabulary, which could make
website publishers more reluctant to use their native language. To further increase our
detection rates, we could translate fragments of text that appear in a certain amount of
dialogs. E.g., our crawl for the 500 websites of Germany did not detect the cookie dialog of
5https://help.eyeo.com/en/adblockplus/how-to-write-filters#elemhide-emulation
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www.bundesregierung.de. The displayed dialog contains the following text:
Wir verwenden Cookies, um Ihnen die optimale Nutzung unserer Webseite zu ermöglichen.
Es werden für den Betrieb der Seite notwendige Cookies gesetzt. Darüber hinaus können Sie
Cookies für Statistikzwecke zulassen. Sie können die Datenschutzeinstellungen anpassen
oder allen Cookies direkt zustimmen.
We could translate a part of the first sentence, i.e., "cookies to enable you to optimally
use our website", to detect dialogs from all countries that contain such content.
6.4. JAVASCRIPT DISABLED
Furthermore, we ran our cookie dialog detection with JavaScript disabled. This is possible
by setting the option "javascript.enabled" to false in our OpenWPM implementation. Fig-
ure 6.5 depicts the results for the same countries as we showed in a previous section. The
higher results of websites where no cookie dialog is detected are prominent. Even Ireland,
with a high detection rate with JavaScript enabled, now only detects a dialog on roughly
30 percent of our dataset. These outcomes indicate that websites expect users to have
JavaScript enabled to consent or reject. However, current regulations seem not to men-
tion that users are obliged to enable JavaScript in their browser to make a consent option
available. Therefore, it is not clear if such practice is lawful. Although most browsers have
JavaScript enabled by default, users can disable it manually, resulting in technical implica-
tions regarding current regulations. As long as website publishers do not set non-essential
cookies, even if no consent option is shown without JavaScript, users’ privacy should be
preserved.
Figure 6.4: Selected cookie dialog button element from www.vlaamsparlement.be.
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(a) The Netherlands. (b) Belgium.
(c) UK. (d) Estonia.
(e) Ireland. (f) Switzerland.
Figure 6.5: Cookie dialog detection with JavaScript disabled.
6.5. UBLOCK EXTENSION
Lastly, we ran our crawler with the uBlock extension6 enabled to examine if it blocks cookie
dialogs. As we cannot manually install extensions in the OpenWPM browser, we down-
6https://addons.mozilla.org/nl/firefox/addon/ublock-origin/
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loaded the uBlock xpi file7 and integrated it into our implementation. We ran uBlock with
the default configuration. No additional settings were set. Figure 6.6 depicts the results for
the same countries as in the previous sections. Overall, the results show that the uBlock
extension does block a number of cookie dialogs. However, without JavaScript, detection
numbers are still lower.
(a) The Netherlands. (b) Belgium.
(c) UK. (d) Estonia.
(e) Ireland. (f) Switzerland.




The presented results show a preliminary answer to our first subquestion. Although our
experiment has a certain error margin, our outcomes indicate the distribution of cookie
dialogs within Europe. Between several countries, there is a significant difference in the
presence of dialogs. Switzerland and Norway have a high number of websites where we
did not detect a dialog, with respectively 66.9 and 67.1 percentage. First indications could
suggest that because these countries are no EU member, such countries would implement
the laws differently, resulting in a lower detection rate. However, the United Kingdom, only
recently a non-EU member state, does have a high detection rate. Higher detection rates
for a country do not necessarily have to result in more violations regarding privacy laws.
However, as tracking and advertisements are frequently used on websites, low detection
rates for a country raise suspicion.
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7
RQ2: TO WHAT EXTENT IS THERE A
DIFFERENCE IN THE PROVIDERS OF
THIRD-PARTY DIALOGS USED IN CCTLDS?
Website publishers can use third-party dialogs to ask for user’s consent instead of using
their own implementation. Publishers should be assured that they are compliant with the
regulations when using a cookie dialog from a CMP. Therefore, they rely on the CMP’s ex-
pertise. A CMP registered with TCF is considered compliant by the IAB and respects the
ePD and GDPR rules. However, this is true as long as the privacy and data protection prac-
tices from the IAB are trusted. A report from the Belgian DPA conducted in October 2020
revealed infringements with the regulations. One conclusion of the DPA was that TCF al-
lows companies to swap sensitive information without the authorization of a user. The
IAB continues to work with European DPAs to improve TCF1. Nevertheless, such findings
and public statements could impact trust around the IAB community. Also, CMPs are not
required to register themselves with the framework.
Earlier reports already show some insights into the usage of CMPs across a set of web-
sites. Each quarter, the ad tech company Kevel (formerly AdZerk) provides a report about
the use of CMPs in the top 10K US sites2. Their Q1 2021 CMP adoption rates show that
25.2% of these websites use a CMP, which is an increase of 12% from the previous Q4 mea-
surement. Further, there is a distinct measurement for publishers that show ads. OneTrust
is the most used CMP with 870 encounters. As the analysis of Kevel is performed on a list
of US websites, the results do not necessarily reflect the CMP landscape of European web-






As a first method to identify the usage of a certain CMP by a website, we saved the JavaScript
content. OpenWPM makes it possible to save unstructured data to a local LevelDB database,
such as the HTML content and scripts that a website uses. LevelDB is a fast key-value stor-
age library written at Google that provides an ordered mapping from string keys to string
values3. This data can also be manually viewed in the developer console of a web browser.
We set the browser parameter save_content to ’script’ in our OpenWPM implementation to
gather this data during an automatic crawling process. After the crawling process, the keys,
which are arbitrary byte arrays, are used to query the database and obtain the content of
the scripts. Only three basic commands are provided in LevelDB to get, put or delete keys
and their values. No SQL syntax is available to query the values in the store directly. We
first performed a get operation to retrieve the script contents. Next, we analyzed the scripts
by searching for strings that start with __tcfapi or __cmp, indicating that the website uses
a CMP associated with TCF. As mentioned in the documentation of TCF 4, these API com-
mands should be available if a CMP is present. Performing this analysis on the output of
a crawl of the top 100 Belgian websites revealed that these function calls are rarely used in
the scripts’ content.
CMPs registered with the IAB are required to provide four API commands: ping, getTC-
Data, addEventListener, and removeEventListener. The getTCData command returns a TC-
Data object that contains a list of properties of the CMP used by a publisher. Figure 7.1
shows an example of such an object and its values. An important property is the TC String,





which captures the preferences a user submits into an encoded and HTTP-transferable
string. It contains the user consent, metadata, and other related fields. The IAB provides an
online tool to encode and decode such strings5. These values are particularly interesting
during the examination after user consent. For our analysis of detecting a CMP, an action
for consent or refusal is not needed. Therefore, we rely on the ping API command to re-
trieve basic information about a CMP, such as the CMP name and TCF version. Table 7.1











Table 7.1: Properties and their values returned when executing the ping API command on the website www.
telegraaf.nl.
There are existing mechanisms to detect the presence of a CMP that uses TCF. For ex-
ample, the browser extension "CMP Check" is developed to perform the getTCData API
command on a website and show the returned data in a frame. Such extensions make it
easy to perform a quick check of whether a website uses TCF. However, such manual analy-
sis on a per-website basis will not scale for our investigation as it is our purpose to automate
the analysis for a large number of websites.
We extended the default OpenWPM implementation with a new command named ’ping_cmp’,
which executes the ping operation on each website visit. We ran the modified OpenWPM
crawler for our list of countries. For each country, we took the top 500 website list from
Tranco. Then, for each website visit, a check is performed whether the __tcfapi function is
available or not to make sure we can execute the ping operation. If the __tcfapi function is
available, the returned CMP id is mapped with its name. Without performing this lookup,
we would only be able to distinguish a CMP by its id but not know the company behind it.
Every Thursday, IAB updates the list of registered CMPs with the TCF6. We save the CMP
name with its id and the property tcfPolicyVersion to verify which version of TCF is used by




7.2. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Figures 7.2a, 7.2b and 7.2c show the results of the crawls for Belgium, The Netherlands, and
France, respectively. These results show a significant difference in the number of websites
that use a CMP per country. Of the Belgian top 500 websites, only 38 websites are able to
perform a ping operation. On the other hand, the results of France show that 139 websites
return data on the ping operation and thus utilize a CMP. The most used CMP for Belgium
and France is Didomi, which could be related to the fact that it is a France company based
in Paris. In The Netherlands, Didomi is in place 5 with LiveRamp on top. The low number
of detected CMPs could be related to the fact that although a CMP is required to provide
the ping command, a website publisher seems not obligated to provide it to its visitors7.
Secondly, it is possible that a website does not set cookies for non-essential purposes, in
which case the publisher is not required to ask for consent and thus not required to use a
cookie dialog. Nevertheless, these outcomes give an indication of CMP usage per country.
(a) Belgium. (b) The Netherlands.
(c) France.
Figure 7.2: CMP usage.
Further, analyzing the countries that are not a member of the European Union from our
data list show low detection of CMP usage for Switzerland and Norway. We detected that 15
7https://iabeurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/2020-02-11-Webinar-CMP-technical-
implementation.pdf - slide 5
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websites from the top 500 websites of Switzerland use a CMP. Our measurement for Norway
reveals CMP usage by 13 websites. On the contrary, for the United Kingdom, 97 websites,
i.e., almost 1/5, respond to the ping operation. Although the first two low measurements
could indicate a relation between EU membership and CMP usage, there seems to be no
direct correlation due to the high UK measurement. Also, we did not perform a crawl for
all non-EU members within European geographical boundaries, which would be needed
to investigate specific correlations further.
7.3. VALIDITY
The web visits that indicate that a CMP is used can be verified. Manually performing the
API command in the developer console of the browser returns the same value when per-
forming this action in our automatic crawl. Manual analysis for a short handpicked list of
websites confirms this. Therefore, we can be confident that our CMP measurement does
not include false positives. However, we acknowledge that our reported numbers are an
undercount. One reason for this is that during the crawling process, some website visits do
not fully complete. Such occurrences are logged in the database table ’incomplete_visits’.
E.g., after the crawl of the top 500 France websites, 33 visit IDs are logged as incomplete.
This happens when the browser crashes or another error occurred such as a time-out. An-
other possibility is that at the time of crawling, a certain website in the list is unreachable.
Such a scenario is less likely because our data list consists of the most used websites of a
country. However, our measurements for Cyprus report 108 incomplete visits. We validated
this high number in a second crawl, which resulted in the same number of incomplete vis-
its. Secondly, we manually visited a selection of the websites that the crawler did not seem
to reach, which confirmed that the websites are unreachable. At this moment, we do not
know the cause for this high number of unreachable websites. Fortunately, the incomplete
visits for the other countries are limited. These events lead to the existence of false nega-
tives.
To further minimize the undercount, we could inspect the HTTP requests send during a
website visit. E.g., our crawling output indicates that the website www.pole-emploi.fr does
not respond to the ping command. Performing the ping manually in the browser confirms
this. But in the network requests, a POST call to privacy.trustcommander.net is identified,
which indicates the website uses the CMP from Commanders Act. Another example of this
behavior is when we visit the website www.philadelphia.be. Performing the ping opera-
tion responds with a JavaScript ReferenceError, which means the tcfapi command is not
available. However, when we click on the link "cookie settings" a popup appears with an
indication in the footer "Powered by OneTrust," which indicates it is likely that this website
uses a CMP from OneTrust. However, due to time constraints, we did not integrate such
analysis into our crawler.
Further, we tested the ping command in the console on the four main browsers, i.e.,
Firefox, Chrome, Edge, and Safari. First indications show that the ping command can be
executed and results in similar outputs across the four browsers. However, as our crawler is
built with Firefox, we did not manually check every website ping result for all the browsers.
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We have to remark that websites can include their own JavaScript functions, which
means that it is possible that a fake implementation of the tcfapi commands could wrongly
indicate the presence of a CMP. We tested a fake implementation of the ping operation
we performed for our research to demonstrate how easily this can be achieved. We used
Witchcraft8, a Google Chrome extension, to inject custom Javascript into a website. For
our test, we used the website tudelft.nl, which does not respond to the ping operation. To
enable script injection, we created a file named tudelft.nl.js with the Javascript content de-
picted in Listing 7.1.
Listing 7.1: JavaScript injection script.
const i n j e c t e d S c r i p t = document . createElement ( ’ scr ipt ’ ) ;
i n j e c t e d S c r i p t . type = ’ t e x t / jav ascr ipt ’ ;
i n j e c t e d S c r i p t . innerHTML = "
function __tcfa pi (command, version , pingReturn ) {
var tcData = { apiVersion : ’ 2 ’ , cmpId : ’ 2 8 ’ } ;
var success = true ;
pingReturn ( tcData , success ) ;
} " ;
document . body . appendChild ( i n j e c t e d S c r i p t ) ;
Then, when we reload the website, our script is included. As a result, our fake ping oper-
ation is available, which returns a tcData object with the apiVersion and cmpId properties.
Such fake implementation could affect our results as our crawler would detect the usage of
a CMP when in reality, this is not the case. Websites could use this technique to influence
certain privacy research examinations, like the one we perform for this research. We did not
observe our crawler results for the presence of such fake implementations. As we measured
a limited usage of CMPs, we assume the presence of such implementations rarely occurs.
However, for complete verification, such analysis could be performed in further research.
Further, to ensure reliability, we performed the crawling process at different times to
check for any differences in the results. Only a negligible difference in the number of in-
complete visits is observed. The measurement of our CMP ping command is constant.
7.4. DISCUSSION
The results of our ping operation reveal a first perspective on the CMP landscape of Europe.
The popular CMP tracker from Kevel9 indicates a CMP usage of 26% for Q2 2021 for the US
top 10K websites. We detect an average of 11,6%, which is substantially lower compared
to their results. However, our measurement is only based on the top 500 websites of each
country. Examination of more websites could yield different results. Smaller EU countries,
such as Malta and Cyprus, indicate very low CMP usage, respectively 1 and 6 websites re-
spond to our ping operation. There exist only 305 websites with a ccTLD .mt for Malta,
which could be a reason for their low rates. For the websites that use a CMP, our measure-




the largest portion. Quantcast and OneTrust are the most used CMPs. These are respec-
tively 10 and 6 times the number one CMP. Next is Didomi, with four occurrences as being
the top 1. Again, comparing it with the report of Kevel shows some differences. According
to their audit, OneTrust is the foremost used CMP. The outcomes we present here could




RQ3: WHAT KIND OF COOKIES ARE SET
BEFORE A USER’S CONSENT IS GIVEN?
In order to identify whether a website sets non-essential cookies, we need to collect the
cookies initially set when visiting a website. Website publishers are obliged to ask users’
consent before any cookies are set for tracking/advertising, or more generally, for non-
essential purposes. Therefore, publishers must show a notification, in the form of a cookie
dialog or banner, to ask users’ consent. This means that only necessary cookies may be
set as long as the user does not give consent. Publishers that do not provide a correct im-
plementation of this behavior violate the regulations and, in extension, R1 of our defined
ruling system from section 5.1.
8.1. EXPERIMENT
The requirements listed by Santos et al. define a rule R1, which states that consent must
be collected before an identifier is stored [SBM19]. The researchers use the term ’identi-
fier’ to acknowledge that other techniques exist besides cookies to store an identifier on a
user’s machine. Violation of this rule is a complex task. E.g., one should analyze all pos-
sible browser storages, such as web caching. Certainly, when a combination of storage
techniques is used, complexity grows. They conclude that there exist no technical tools to
identify the purposes of identifiers. As our research is focused on the use of cookies, for our
derived rule R1, we are mainly interested in the purpose of cookies set before consent.
A crucial element in this observation is the list of purposes we use as a basis to detect a
violation. We use Cookiepedia, the largest database of pre-categories cookies maintained
by OneTrust1, to identify the category of a cookie. Table 8.1 depicts the categories used
by Cookiepedia, which is based on the classification developed by the UK International







These cookies are essential in order to enable you to move around the web-
site and use its features, such as accessing secure areas of the website.
Without these cookies services you have asked for, like shopping baskets
or e-billing, cannot be provided.
Performance These cookies collect information about how visitors use a website, for in-
stance which pages visitors go to most often, and if they get error messages
from web pages. These cookies do not collect information that identifies
a visitor. All information these cookies collect is aggregated and therefore
anonymous. It is only used to improve how a website works.
Functionality These cookies allow the website to remember choices you make (such as
your user name, language or the region you are in) and provide enhanced,
more personal features. For instance, a website may be able to provide you
with local weather reports or traffic news by storing in a cookie the region in
which you are currently located. These cookies can also be used to remem-
ber changes you have made to text size, fonts and other parts of web pages
that you can customize. They may also be used to provide services you have
asked for such as watching a video or commenting on a blog. The informa-
tion these cookies collect may be anonymized and they cannot track your
browsing activity on other websites.
Targeting /
Advertising
These cookies are used to deliver adverts more relevant to you and your
interests. They are also used to limit the number of times you see an ad-
vertisement as well as help measure the effectiveness of the advertising
campaign. They are usually placed by advertising networks with the web-
site operator’s permission. They remember that you have visited a website
and this information is shared with other organizations such as advertisers.
Quite often targeting or advertising cookies will be linked to site function-
ality provided by the other organization.
Table 8.1: Cookie purposes classification by Cookiepedia.
There exist other lists that map a cookie name to its purpose. E.g., the Open Cookie
Database, a project hosted on GitHub3, is an effort to describe and categorize all major
cookies. The completeness of this database depends on the community’s input.
As a first examination, we measured the number of cookies set when initially visiting a
website. Although this measurement is not directly related to the purpose of a cookie, it is
a first indication of how much information is gathered or stored on the user machine. We
enabled the browser parameter ’cookie_instrument’ in our OpenWPM implementation to
collect the cookies per website during a crawl. It records cookies set both by JavaScript and
via HTTP responses. The collected data is persisted in the SQLite table ’javascript_cookies’.
3https://github.com/jkwakman/Open-Cookie-Database
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OpenWPM does not only collect the cookies set but saves all related traffic. I.e., it records
an element in the table when a cookie is added-or-changed or when a cookie is deleted.
Therefore, we cannot rely on the number of rows per website visit to count the number
of cookies. We loop over the added-or-changed records and drop those from the list en-
countered in the deleted records. As a result, the cookies that are actually set and thus not
deleted remain. The code snippet in Listing 8.1 outlines the core loop of our analysis script
to calculate the number of cookies set for each website of a crawl. Setting the param ’in-
place’ on True ensures that the deletion is performed in the panda DataFrame itself, so we
do not have to create a new variable.
Listing 8.1: Collecting only the cookies that are added.
for r1 in addedOrChangedRecords .name. values :
i f r2 in deletedValues .name. values :
deletedValues . drop ( [ deletedValues . index [ ( deletedValues [ "name" ]
== n) ] [ 0 ] ] , inplace=True ) addedOrChangedRecords . drop ( [
addedOrChangedRecords . index [ ( addedOrChangedRecords [ "name" ]
== n) ] [ 0 ] ] , inplace=True )
Further, we extract the names of the cookies per website to a JSON file. The element from
the JSON is depicted as an example in Listing 8.2, where our crawler has detected five dif-
ferent cookies for the website www.belgium.be.
Listing 8.2: Element from cookie extraction file.
" http : / /www. belgium . be " : [
" language " ,
"\ _ga " ,
"\ _gid " ,
"\ _gat " ,
"TS016a4e3d"
] ,
It is possible to look up the purpose of each found cookie manually via the website of
Cookiepedia. However, such a manual technique is not scalable. Unfortunately, Cook-
iepedia does not provide an API to request the purpose of a cookie, which would make it
convenient to request a bulk of purposes. Therefore, we implemented a script based on
Puppeteer4, a Node library often used for testing functionalities and crawling websites to
capture specific DOM elements. Our script concatenates each cookie of our JSON list to
the Cookiepedia URL "https://cookiepedia.co.uk/cookies/" that is used to discover its pur-
pose. During the automatic website visit, we extract the text of the HTML elements used
by Cookiepedia to display the description and purpose of the cookie. We count each en-
countered purpose to produce a final sum of purposes for each URL of our JSON output.
Listing 8.3 shows the loop we perform from our script to capture each purpose from the
Cookiepedia website.
Listing 8.3: Part of our Puppeteer script to discover cookie purposes.
for ( l e t cookie_name of cookie_names [ u r l ] ) {
4https://pptr.dev
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t r y {
await page . goto ( base_url + cookie_name ) ;
const description = await page . $eval ( ’ # content − l e f t > p ’ , e l
=> e l . textContent ) ;
const purpose = await page . $eval ( ’ # content − l e f t > p >
strong ’ , e l => e l . textContent ) ;
cookie_purposes . push ( {
name: cookie_name ,
description : description ,
purpose : purpose
} ) ;
switch ( purpose ) {
case ’ Targeting / Advertising ’ :
target_and_ad ++;
break ;
case ’ S t r i c t l y Necessary ’ :
necessary ++;
break ;
case ’ Functionality ’ :
f u n c t i o n a l i t y ++;
break ;











We did not choose to integrate this crawling process into our OpenWPM extension
as this step is part of the analysis process. Secondly, it is currently not possible to per-
form headless crawls with OpenWPM. With Puppeteer, we can extract the data via headless
crawls, which increases performance as the browser does not have to be actively opened
and closed for each purpose extraction. We save the result in a separate JSON file for each
country for further analysis.
8.2. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
We ran our crawler against our Tranco datasets. Figure 8.1 depicts the number of cookies
set by our top 500 websites of The Netherlands and Belgium. We use the Empirical Cu-
mulative Distribution Function (ECDF), often used in exploratory data analysis (EDA), to
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observe the number of websites that set a certain amount of cookies. It outlines a complete
view of how the data is distributed. In Figure 8.1a, the plotted ECDF of The Netherlands
data shows that 85.2 percent of the websites, which amounts to 426, set 2 cookies or more.
Similar values are observed in Figure 8.1b. 77.4 percent of the Belgian websites set 2 cook-
ies or more. One Belgian website, a Cameroon information website5 is an outlier that sets
144 cookies on the initial visit. The outlier from The Netherlands, www.1limburg.nl, sets
83 cookies on the initial visit. When we visit this website, a cookie dialog appears. Inspect-
ing the cookies indeed reveals that many cookies are set before clicking on accept. E.g., a
cookie with the name "PugT" is set. According to the Cookiepedia database, this cookie
is mainly used for targeting and advertising purposes, which could mean the website is in
violation with the legislation as it already sets a cookie for non-essential purposes before a
user gives consent.
We used an analysis technique called bootstrap sampling. By resampling our collected
dataset with replacement, we calculate the confidence intervals and standard error for the
number of cookies set. ’With replacement’ means the samples are independent of each
other as the numbers taken for constructing each sample are returned to the main data set
before the sample extraction. We extracted 1000 random samples, with each sample the
same length as our main set. This amount of samples is needed to ensure more certainty
for our calculations. The code snippet in Listing 8.4 depicts the loop we perform over our
main set to calculate the mean of each sample. We used the library Numpy, abbreviated as
’np’, to perform the calculations.
Listing 8.4: Calculation of mean for a list of samples.
sample_means = [ ]
n = len ( df . amount_of_cookies )
for sample in range ( 0 , 1000) :
sample_values = np . random . choice ( a=df . amount_of_cookies . values ,
s i z e =n)
sample_mean = np .mean( sample_values )
sample_means . append(sample_mean)
Figure 8.2 shows the results of the calculations for The Netherlands and Belgium, de-
picted as a probability density function (PDF). Using a PDF, we can examine the probabil-
ity of other random samples. Thus, how many cookies a website will likely set. The total
underlying body of the curve equals one, which is the sum of all the probabilities for the
number of cookies set. The PDF for The Netherlands in Figure 8.2a depicts that websites
set between 9.2 and 11.1 cookies, with a confidence of 95 percent. The results for Belgium
are in the same trend in Figure 8.2b, with low and high confidence intervals of 8.3 and 10.3.
Further, the standard error of the mean (SEM), which measures the distribution of sample
means around the mean of the original dataset, is respectively 0.46 and 0.51. Comparing
the two countries shows a slight difference in the distributions. Belgium puts on average a
lower number of cookies than the Netherlands.
5https://www.camer.be
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(a) The Netherlands - number of cookies - ECDF.
(b) Belgium - number of cookies - ECDF.
Figure 8.1: The Netherlands and Belgium - Number of cookies (empirical cumulative distribution function).
Figure 8.3 depicts the mean number of cookies for each country of our dataset displayed
in the geographical map of Europe. We used the GeoJSON standard to generate the map.
GeoJSON is a format for encoding a variety of geographic data structures. In August 2016,
RCF 79466 was published as the standard specification for the GeoJSON format. Our Geo-




(a) The Netherlands - number of cookies - PDF.
(b) Belgium - number of cookies - PDF.
Figure 8.2: The Netherlands and Belgium - Number of cookies (probability distribution function).




The map shows a higher number of average cookies per website for some countries.
The United Kingdom sets an average of almost 20 cookies per website. Figure 8.4a shows
the plotted ECDF for the UK. Besides the one outlier, the distribution is more curved com-
pared to other ECDF plots. It is clear that globally, UK websites set a higher amount of
cookies per website. It does not necessarily have to mean that these websites violate the
regulations. Further analysis is needed to observe the purposes of the cookies set. Austria,
on the other hand, is almost colored white on the map, with a rounded average of 6 cookies
per website. The ECDF of Austria, depicted in Figure 8.4b shows a steep curve. 68.4 percent
of the websites set 2 cookies or more, with only a few outliers. For completion, we mention
that the outcomes for the countries Cyprus and Malta are not shown on the map as these
are not included in our GeoJSON file. Their rounded average cookies set are respectively
6 and 8, which means they fall into the lower region of the spectrum and are comparable
with Austria and Belgium.
Figure 8.5 depicts the number of all collected cookies for our top 500 websites per coun-
try mapped to its purpose extracted from the Cookiepedia database. In descending order,
we first encounter the United Kingdom. As previously mentioned, the UK sets the high-
est average amount of cookies per website. A relatively small amount of cookies is set for
strictly necessary and functionality purposes, marked green and blue. Most cookies are set
for performance, i.e., to record how visitors use a website, and targeting/advertising pur-
poses. The same trend is observed for the other countries. Further, there are a high number
of unknown cookies that cannot be linked to any purpose. Or at least, it is not known by
the Cookiepedia database. Because of the high number of unknowns, we further examined
the content of these cookies. Figure 8.6 depicts the top 10 cookies of the Netherlands, Bel-
gium, the United Kingdom, and the Czech Republic, of which the purpose is unknown. The
cookie name "fr" recurs several times. For the United Kingdom, this cookie is even counted
169 times. Even though this is a high number, it is only a small percentage of the 3,309
unknown UK cookies. It is also the most common unknown cookie for the Netherlands.
Further investigation via search engines reveals that the purpose of this cookie is related to
Facebook. The Facebook cookie policy page9 states that the "fr" cookie is used to display,
measure, and improve the relevance of advertisements and has a life span of 90 days. Not
all descriptions of the purposes seem to match between different policies. E.g., the cookie
policy of the company MSCI states that Akamai uses the cookie "ak_bmsc" to optimize
site performance and security10, whereas EU4Digital states that it is a functionality cookie
placed by Mailchimp to manage and control lists11. For our observed countries, the top 10
does not cover a high percentage of the total unknown cookies. We would therefore need
to manually examine many cookies to uncover more purposes. Due to time constraints, we





Figure 8.3: Average number of cookies set prior to consent per country.
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(a) United Kingdom - number of cookies - ECDF.
(b) Austria - number of cookies - ECDF.
Figure 8.4: United Kingdom and Austria - Number of cookies (empirical cumulative distribution function).
8.3. VALIDITY
To validate our results, we handpicked several random websites from our datasets to man-
ually check the number of cookies set. Examing the cookies in the Firefox browser re-
veals mostly the same number of cookies measured as our crawl output. However, some-
times a minor difference is observed. E.g., our manual check for the website https://nos.nl
observed a cookie named "_chartbeat2", but our crawl output detected a second similar
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Figure 8.5: Cookie purposes according to Cookiepedia for cookies set prior to consent.
cookie with the name "_chartbeat4". Also, distinct sets of cookies are detected between
different browsers. Again, when we analyze the cookies set for the NOS website in Google
Chrome, only six cookies are shown in the developer console compared to twelve in Firefox.
A reason for this diversity is that each browser handles cookies differently and has different
default configurations regarding privacy. As our OpenWPM crawler uses a version of Fire-
fox Nightly, it can have other privacy configuration options enabled. This config variation
in browsers does not make it a straightforward task to validate the output manually. Also,
cookies are split up according to their domain in the developer console. The number of
cookies in each domain cannot always be counted together, as some cookie names are du-
plicated in multiple domains. Figure 8.7 depicts the list of domains observed in the Firefox
developer console when visiting the website www.thelocal.fr.
Counting the exact number of cookies of all domains manually without duplication is
a tedious task and error-prone. Fortunately, the extraction of cookies during a crawl is a
standard option in OpenWPM. It is regularly used in previous privacy research studies and
is, therefore, more tested than our extended commands. Another peculiarity observed is
the difference in the behavior of a website between Firefox in Ubuntu and other operating
systems. Our crawler detected a high number of cookies for the website matchdirect.fr.
Manual verification revealed that no cookie dialog was shown in Firefox on Ubuntu and
immediately set cookies on the machine. On the other hand, a cookie dialog did show up
in Firefox on other operating systems. It was tested in private mode to disable possible
cache from previous sessions. Although we did not encounter similar cases in our manual
analysis, some websites in our automatic crawl could behave differently in Ubuntu.
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(a) The Netherlands top 10 unknown cookies. (b) Belgium top 10 unknown cookies.
(c) United Kingdom top 10 unknown cookies. (d) Czech Republic top 10 unknown cookies.
Figure 8.6: Top 10 unknown cookies.
Figure 8.7: Cookie domains from www.thelocal.fr displayed in the Firefox developer console.
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8.4. DISCUSSION
Although there currently exist many technologies for tracking online user behavior, cook-
ies are still widely used. Legislators that will have to implement coming updates of current
regulations, such as the ePrivacy Regulation, await the difficult task of increasing trans-
parency and diminishing privacy concerns. Our outcomes indicate that transparency re-
garding the purpose of cookies is still below par. A large portion of the cookies we collected
cannot be related to any purpose. This unknown gap is problematic and diminishes val-
ues of trust promoted by recognized institutions such as the IAB. Hereby related is that the
largest database of cookie purposes is maintained by OneTrust, an organization that pro-
vides a CMP and therefore not completely neutral. Even manual research for a specific
cookie purpose results in various descriptions. Further, for all observed countries, a signif-
icant amount of cookies are set for tracking and advertisement purposes before consent is
given. Although the value of the cookie could not yet hold any personal information, the




RQ4: TO WHAT EXTENT ARE COOKIE
DIALOGS USING INTERFACE ELEMENTS TO
NUDGE USERS IN GIVING THEIR CONSENT?
For this last subquestion, we examine the existence of dark patterns that website publishers
implement to nudge users in giving their consent, i.e., the practice where design elements
are used to persuade a user to click on a particular element. R2 of our defined ruling system
from Section 5.1, based on R13 of the research of Santos et al., states that a cookie dialog
needs to provide balanced consent and refuse choices. As discussed, the exact interpre-
tation of balanced is a grey area as there is no standardization in the design elements of
cookies dialogs. Therefore, to cover a wide range of dark patterns, manual analysis is still
needed. Santos et al. state that it is not possible to verify the requirement automatically
because of the lack of standards. As our goal is to identify violations automatically, we limit
the scope of our detection mechanism to observe whether unambiguous options are avail-
able to consent and reject.
9.1. EXPERIMENT
To determine whether a cookie dialog presents a balanced choice for consent and reject,
we collect the color, width, and height for further analysis. In earlier research, Turland et
al. [TCJ+15] rearranged the presentation of wireless networks to users by placing the most
secure options at the top. Therefore, they used color codes to mark unsecured networks as
red and secured as green. The combination of positioning and color increased the rate of
secured network selection by 60 percent. Nudging participants only by changing the po-
sition had a limited effect. Other research studies show that nudging people’s behavior by
using colors can be used in various environments. E.g., Thorndike et al. [TSR+12] showed
that using color-coded labels improved sales of healthy items in a hospital cafeteria. Cur-
rently, there seems to be no research performed specifically towards the interaction of con-
sent and reject elements in cookie dialogs and how color, positioning, and other attributes
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influence users’ behavior. Nevertheless, previously mentioned studies show that different
design choices influence behavior.
We extended our OpenWPM implementation with a new command "detect_dark_patterns".
We used a broad naming for the command as new detection patterns can be added in the
future. To detect whether a consent and reject element exists on a website, we search for
certain text strings. An essential part of this detection mechanism is the strings we use to
identify an element on the webpage that results in consent or refusal when the user clicks
on it. We based our list of strings by manually analyzing the words or sentences used on
consent and reject elements in a partial list of our top websites of the Netherlands and Bel-
gium. As not all websites use the native language of the country but instead use English
terms, we also added the translations of the observed strings. We observed that many web-
sites display the same terms, which results in a limited set of strings. The text of a subset of
HTML elements that contain an item of our string list, depicted in Table 9.1, is identified as
a consent element.











Table 9.1: Dutch and English terms used to detect consent elements.
To search and select an element, we use an XPath query which Selenium executes. List-
ing 9.1 shows our composed XPath query.
Listing 9.1: XPath query to select consent elements.
elements = webdriver . f ind \_elements\_by\_xpath (
"// button [ ( contains ( t r a n s l a t e ( . , ’ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ’ ,
’ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ’ ) , { value } ) or "
" contains ( t r a n s l a t e ( @aria−label , ’ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ’ ,
’ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ’ ) , { value } ) ) and "
"not ( "
" contains ( t r a n s l a t e ( . , ’ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ’ , ’
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ’ ) , ’ niet ’ ) or "
" contains ( t r a n s l a t e ( . , ’ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ’ , ’
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ’ ) , ’ not ’ ) or "
" contains ( t r a n s l a t e ( . , ’ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ’ , ’
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ’ ) , ’ . . . ’ ) "
" ) ] | "
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"// button [ normalize−space ( t r a n s l a t e ( t e x t ( ) , ’
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ’ , ’ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ’ ) )
= ’ok ’ ] | "
"//a [ contains ( t r a n s l a t e ( . , ’ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ’ , ’
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ’ ) , { value } ) and "
"not ( "
" contains ( t r a n s l a t e ( . , ’ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ’ , ’
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ’ ) , ’ niet ’ ) or "
" contains ( t r a n s l a t e ( . , ’ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ’ , ’
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ’ ) , ’ not ’ ) or "
" contains ( t r a n s l a t e ( . , ’ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ’ , ’
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ’ ) , ’ . . . ’ ) "
" ) ] | "
"//a [ normalize−space ( t r a n s l a t e ( t e x t ( ) , ’
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ’ , ’ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ’ ) )
= ’ok ’ ] | "
"//span [ contains ( @class , ’ a−button−inner ’ ) and "
" contains ( t r a n s l a t e ( . , ’ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ’ , ’
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ’ ) , { value } ) ] | "
"// input [ contains ( t r a n s l a t e ( @value , ’ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
’ , ’ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ’ ) , { value } ) ] "
. format (
value = ’\" ’ + b + ’ \ " ’ ) )
The translate function is needed to convert HTML elements text to lowercase, as our
search needs to be case insensitive. A subgroup of DOM elements and related attributes is
examined to minimize the chances of selecting the wrong elements. I.e., buttons and the
related aria-label attribute, anchor elements, a specific span element with class "a-button-
inner", and input elements. Further, we only examine div elements when there is no match
for the previously mentioned elements as div elements often contain text related to the
actual website content. Therefore, we also limit the string length to 20 characters. If no
element is found, we further search for the presence of iframes related to cookie dialogs. If
present, the same analysis via xPath is performed on the content of the iframe. Finally, the
width, height, and background color attributes are selected from the element. We save the
color by its RGB and converted HEX values.
In the first implementation, we used the Python library google_translator to translate
our list of strings to different languages. Such a technique increases extendibility as a lan-
guage parameter has to be provided to our command to translate the list of strings to the
native language of a certain country. However, in subsequent crawler runs, the translate
function of the library yields an error indicating that too many requests are performed1.
Therefore, our current implementation uses different lists for each language, which is a
manual translation of our Dutch list via Google Translate2. We acknowledge that our trans-




ciated country. To improve our literal translations, a native speaker or professional inter-
preter should verify and correct our lists.
9.2. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Differentiating colors into categories that nudge users on different levels is a grey area and
requires specific research, which we do not perform here. We base our analysis on colors
used in previous research and use our own judgement for deviances. We divide colors into
two self-created categories. Friendly colors such as green and blue relate to nudging users.
Hard colors such as red and black relate to visualizing danger to drive away a user from
clicking on the button. Further, we measure the width and height to observe discrepancies
between consent and reject elements.
First, we are interested in how many accept and reject buttons we can identify in a
cookie dialog. If we cannot find a reject button but can find an accept button, this would
suggest a dark pattern and result in non-compliance. For this analysis, we use the same
datasets, i.e., the top 500 websites of the European countries filtered from the global Tranco
list. Figure 9.1 shows an overview of the number of consent and reject elements discovered
by our crawler. The top 8 of the list are countries situated in the western part of Europe.
France is at the top, for which we discovered 306 websites that have a direct option to con-
sent and 142 websites with a reject option. Other countries reveal higher differences, e.g.,
about 270 websites of the UK offer a consent option and 70 a reject option, slightly less than
The Netherlands. Notice that we only detect consent and reject elements in the first layer
of a cookie dialog. E.g., Figure 9.2a shows a consent and reject option for the website ri-
jksmuseum.nl. Figure 9.2b shows the cookie dialog of the website nieuws.nl with no direct
reject option. We do not detect a possible reject option in a second or third layer behind
the cookie configuration link. Malta, with its 305 websites, has a relatively high detection
rate. We detected 110 elements, of which 97 are for consent and 13 for rejection. Thus, ap-
proximately one-third of the websites of Malta offers a consent option, a rejection option,
or both. In comparison, we detect only 53 websites with a consent option and two websites
with a direct option to reject for Norway. On average, our crawler detected 171 elements
per country.
Figure 9.3 zooms in on the number of reject elements found per country. With 142
reject elements found, France is at the top of the list. The top four of the list are the same
as in Figure 9.1. Following are Switzerland and Luxembourg, with respectively 41 and 39
reject elements found. After Cyprus, which ends the top ten, the number of reject elements
found further declines sharply. At the bottom is Poland, for which we did not detect any
reject element.
Figure 9.4 depicts the background colors of the consent and reject elements for The
Netherlands, France, Ireland, and Austria. These colors are detected automatically by our
crawler. To observe the context where the elements are used, we manually obtained the
background color of the cookie dialog. Further, we only show the elements of websites
with both a consent and reject option to compare the colors and detect possible dark pat-
terns. Therefore, we filtered out the records that have elements without a color or with
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Figure 9.1: Number of consent and reject elements per country.
(a) Cookie dialog of www.rijksmuseum.nl. (b) Cookie dialog of www.nieuws.nl.
Figure 9.2: Cookie dialog examples with and without a direct reject option.
a transparent color. Overall, we notice that the color green is often used for the consent
option. Only one French website uses a green color for its reject option. For the reject op-
tions, the colors red, white, grey, and black are the most prominent. The background color
of the cookie dialog has mostly the color white or black, or is similar to the elements’ color.
Using the same color analysis from earlier research [TCJ+15] to identify dark patterns, we
notice that most websites with both a consent and reject element nudge a user in giving
consent. There are a few exceptions where the consent element has a red color. However,
the number of these exceptions is negligible. Also, we notice that several records have the
exact same RGB colors. E.g., several records from Ireland depicted in Figure 9.4c have the
same green and black value for their elements. Manual analysis reveals that some of these
websites use the CMP Cookiebot. Therefore, the cookie dialogs have a similar design.
Further, the difference in width and height is shown in the last two columns. In partic-
ular, we subtract respectively the width and height of the reject element from the consent
element. This results several times in negative consent width values. Depending on the lan-
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Figure 9.3: Number of reject elements per country.
guage, the text value of a reject element is often longer than the value of a consent element
as it includes extra words such as "niet" or "not". Besides a few exceptions, most websites
reveal no difference for the reject option height. Overall there seems to be no striking dark
pattern related to the elements’ width and height.
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(a) Consent and reject HTML elements colors, width and height dif-
ference - The Netherlands.
(b) Consent and reject HTML elements colors, width and height dif-
ference - France.
(c) Consent and reject HTML elements colors, width and height dif-
ference - Ireland.
(d) Consent and reject HTML elements colors, width and height dif-
ference - Austria.
Figure 9.4: Consent and reject HTML elements colors, width and height difference.
9.3. VALIDITY
We validated our crawler results by manually visiting the first hundred websites of The
Netherlands. The outcomes indicated that all explicit consent and reject options were cor-
rectly discovered. However, we encountered a few particularities.
The website www.radiologyassistant.nl shows a dialog with two options, as depicted in Fig-
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ure 9.5a. Due to the text length and the fact that the options are no button or link element,
our crawler did not detect these. However, the user needs to perform a second click on the
button "Continue". Therefore, it is not wrong that our crawler did not detect these. Further,
as we already mentioned, we do not detect options in a second or third layer. Figure 9.5b
shows the cookie dialog from www.scientias.nl for which we only detect the consent but-
ton with the text "Toestemming". Also, we detected one false positive for a website that
shows no cookie dialog. Our crawler detected the website due to the existence of the word
"prima" in the string "Skip to primary content" which does not exceed our string limit. Our
crawl does not catch such exceptions. Besides validating the presence of the elements, we
also verified the color, width, and height attributes. Our first preliminary checks verify that
our crawler records the width and height as recognized by the browser. The color attribute
cannot always be correctly captured as the CSS attribute "background-color" is sometimes
applied on a higher element in the HTML DOM structure. We observed this behavior on
one website during validation.
(a) Cookie dialog of www.radiologyassistant.nl. (b) Cookie dialog of www.scientias.nl.
Figure 9.5: Cookie dialog validation examples.
As our research is performed in a dutch environment, we have to acknowledge that
we are more familiar with languages from surrounding countries. Therefore, our transla-
tion lists for other languages can contain words not often used in cookie dialogs from the
respective country. We asked a native speaker from Romania to review our terms, which
showed that some translations are unlikely to be used in our context. E.g., our Romanian
translation "admis" is rather uncommon in the cookie dialog context. The verb form, "ad-
mite", would be more suitable. Professional interpreters should further validate the strings
from our list to filter out strange translations.
9.4. DISCUSSION
Although our detection mechanism for identifying dark patterns needs further enhance-
ments to increase the scope, our implementation shows that it is possible to detect pos-
sible usage of dark patterns by website publishers. Our investigation focused on observ-
ing the use of balanced consent and reject choices. Many websites show a green or blue
color for the consent option and a black or red color for the reject option. As previous
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research [TCJ+15] shows that the use of these particular colors influences the behavior of
users and which option they select, we can conclude that many website publishers con-
sciously try to nudge users into giving their consent. As there are currently no design crite-
ria for cookie dialogs, website publishers can use such methods for their benefit. Currently,
the analysis of our gathered data is a manual process. If clear design criteria were estab-
lished, these could serve as input to automate the analysis. E.g., certain ranges of RGB
colors could be allowed for elements that our crawler could check. Further, the number of
websites that offer a direct option to reject is disturbingly low. In the best case, users can re-
ject in a second or third layer. Worst case, there is not option to reject at all. Such practices




10.1. TO WHAT EXTENT CAN AN AUTOMATIC SCANNING TOOL HELP
PERFORM AN INFORMED AUDIT ON COOKIE BANNERS RE-
SPECTING THE LEGAL RULES?
In this research, we explored several mechanisms to discover compliance violations in
cookie dialogs automatically. Although earlier research studies already investigated the us-
age of cookie dialogs and possible violations according to the European legislation, our
research focuses on using automation techniques that could support compliance checks
performed by privacy auditors. Therefore, we used OpenWPM, a web privacy measure-
ment framework based on Selenium that is scalable and often used in previous studies.
As it is an open-source project, we extended the standard implementation with our own
commands. Figure 10.1 shows the overview of the proof of concept we implemented.
First, we revealed significant differences in the number of websites that present a cookie
dialog between different European countries. For The Netherlands and Belgium, our de-
tection command indicates that 53.7% and 43.6% of websites from the top 500 .nl and .be
websites worldwide display a cookie dialog. Other countries deviate from these detection
numbers. In total, we scanned 14805 websites, for which we measure an average of 47.8%.
Also, many websites seem to rely on JavaScript, although users are not obliged to enable it
in their browser. A user who disables JavaScript will not see a large percentage of the cookie
dialogs and is therefore not able to consent or decline. Further, detecting the specific usage
of a Consent Management Provider (CMP) by website publishers shows that besides a few
popular CMPs such as Quantcast and OneTrust, there is a high diversity between different
European countries.
Next, to uncover violations, we used a ruling system based on two rules that originate
from a previous study [SBM19] and the GDPR. For rule R1, we collected the cookies set be-
fore users’ consent and linked them to a specific purpose from Cookiepedia. Disturbingly
we found that a high number of cookies set are used for targeting and advertising purposes
before consent is given. Thus, despite community efforts such as the IAB, users’ data is
62
Figure 10.1: Overview of the proof of concept we implemented.
still used for illegal activities, often without their knowledge. Also, the purpose for a high
number of cookies cannot be revealed, which could be problematic if the purpose is not
declared on the corresponding website. Lastly, for rule R2, we automatically detected a spe-
cific dark pattern, namely the presence of balanced consent and reject options in a cookie
dialog. Results showed that colors such as green and blue are regularly used for the con-
sent element, whereby the color for the reject element is the same as the background color
of the cookie dialog, or black or red. Also, many websites do not show a direct option to
refuse. Such patterns are encountered in all European countries. Our focus on automa-
tion showed that it is possible to audit a large number of websites simultaneously to detect
compliance violations in cookie dialogs. Although we only identified a subset of possible
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violations, we believe that integrating more automation in current compliance processes
could extend the detection scope. As a result, more website publishers could be triggered
to follow the regulations, or at least they would be aware of existing violations.
10.2. LIMITATIONS
Cookie dialog detection. We use a predefined list of keywords from Adblock with manual
additions as input to detect a cookie dialog. However, our list is not fully complete. As
shown in our validation, not all cookie dialogs are found. As websites can use a wide range
of keywords in their cookie dialog implementation, it is difficult to detect all cookie dialogs.
CMP detection. We base our CMP detection mechanism on using the TCF ping opera-
tion. Although it is a reliable API command, it is not available for all websites, even if it uses
a CMP. Our implementation does not search within the network requests to analyze certain
links or parameters to identify CMP usage without the ping operation.
Cookies. We only analyze cookies set before consent. Further, our analysis is based on
the purposes provided by Cookiepedia. If a cookie is not recognized by Cookiepedia, we
mark it as missing. However, the purpose of the cookie could be known by other databases
or is available on the website itself.
Balanced consent and refuse options. The determination of the context color, i.e., the
background color of the cookie dialog, is not an automatic process. We manually identified
this color afterward for our analysis, as our crawler only selects possible consent and reject
elements and not the cookie dialog itself. Further, analyzing the data for violations is still a
grey area and a manual process as there are currently no fixed specifications.
System setup. For this research, we were able to run six crawlers at once. Although we
can run multiple crawlers simultaneously, there is a limit on system resources. Therefore,
to collect the data for all countries, multiple runs are required.
10.3. FUTURE WORK
Tracking technologies. Our research is focused on the use of cookies and related di-
alogs. However, as new technologies constantly arise, website visitors can be tracked by
other mechanisms besides cookies. Bellero et al. [BM18] investigated the privacy threats
of three client storage mechanisms, namely, Web Storage, Web SQL Database, and Indexed
Database API. Amongst these three, Web Storage is the most frequently used. Of the top
10K Alexa websites, 63 percent use Web Storage for tracking purposes. Consent is also
needed for these tracking technologies. Further research could investigate to what extent
such mechanisms are used for tracking purposes before user consent.
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Data protection laws. Our research is based on European data protection legislation such
as the ePrivacy Directive and the GDPR. However, other parts of the world are covered by
different regulations. E.g., the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) in the United States
or the Brazilian General Data Protection Law (LGPD). Although some parts of these laws
can have similar rules, each law will have its particularities which will affect how automa-
tion techniques can be used to detect violations. Therefore, we cannot determine to what
extent our implementation is compatible with other laws. E.g., not all laws may require
website publishers to use cookie dialogs. Therefore, future research could focus on differ-
ent legislation, which then could be compared with our results to examine the difference
in implementation techniques.
Cookies. For our examination in RQ3, we showed that the purpose for a high number of
cookies could not be determined. This is problematic and is contrary to the transparency
requirements from the IAB. Therefore, future work should address these unknown cookies
to investigate whether they are used for tracking or advertising purposes. We performed
such an analysis manually only for a few cookies. Also, we did not investigate cookies set
after user consent. A more advanced implementation of our crawler is needed to click on
the consent button for such an examination. In the same line, the number of cookies and
their purposes could be gathered after clicking the reject option, if available, to analyze if
only cookies for essential purposes are set. If no reject option is available, additional layers
in the dialog could be inspected.
Dark patterns. Further, in RQ4, we detected one specific dark pattern, namely, whether
balanced consent and reject options are available. Therefore, we only touched the surface
of design choices website publishers can use to nudge users. E.g., Soe et al. [SNGS20] iden-
tify so-called forced action patterns where users are blocked from accessing a website. To
continue, users have to click on it. Figure 10.2 shows an example of such behavior. Cur-
rently, our implementation does not detect such a pattern.
Borgesius et al. [GSZBB21] conducted online experiments to explore the effects of de-
sign nudges. They conclude that current cookie dialog implementations do not enable
meaningful choices for users. Their research was recently conducted in 2021, which shows
that dark patterns are still a broad issue. Further research should continue on such find-
ings to explore how automation techniques could be integrated to support the detection of
violations.
Mobile. Another possible research area is the use of cookies and dialogs in mobile envi-
ronments. It would be interesting to examine if cookies are set in a different manner or
quantity on a mobile phone. Also, the layout of the implemented dialogs can have different
layouts due to the smaller screen size. Such differences could be intentional. A preliminary
crawl for a small list of 17 websites with Puppeteer1, a Node library used for crawling and
testing, shows a marginal difference in the average cookie set. The average amount of GET
1https://github.com/koenae/crawler
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Figure 10.2: Cookie dialog from www.vice.com which forces a user to take an action.
requests does show a significant difference. However, such measurements are highly fluc-
tuant and influenced by the timing of the requests. These findings could be a baseline for
further in-depth research.
Research threats. Lastly, we have to take into account that website publishers could ma-
nipulate our research output. As discussed in RQ2, a CMP ping operation can be mimicked
to trick the scanning process. However, this is just one example we observed. Other tech-
niques could exist to influence the outcomes of privacy research for the benefit of the pub-
lisher. We believe that such practices are currently not widely used as automation tech-
niques are not standard built into regulation audit processes. Nonetheless, as automa-
tion techniques evolve and have an increasing impact on detecting violations, publishers
could be tempted to explore backdoors in order to appear compliant. Such practices would
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